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I. Introduction 
The death penalty in America is a punishment with two 
essential and inseparable dimensions: (1) solitary confinement 
under sentence of death for years and even decades, followed by 
(2) execution in the death chamber in what amounts to a state-
sponsored homicide. In practice, these dimensions merge, yielding 
a regime of solitary confinement that culminates in a death by 
state-sponsored homicide. The killing process—from solitary 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Robert Johnson is a professor of justice, law and criminology at American 
University and an award-winning author of books and articles on crime and 
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confinement on death row through execution in the death house—
is an objectively dehumanizing one: condemned prisoners are 
stored on death row like objects rather than human beings, and 
then dispatched in the death chamber following an impersonal and 
degrading execution routine.  
It is fitting, then, that many condemned prisoners see 
themselves as “the living dead” and death row confinement as “a 
living death.” These observations were first established in my 
ethnographic study of life under sentence of death on Alabama’s 
death row at Holman Prison in 1979,1 reinforced in my study of the 
death house and execution process in Virginia in 1989,2 and 
recently confirmed by other observers (including the ACLU).3 The 
notion that the condemned are in some sense dead before they are 
executed supports the prescient observations of the French 
existentialist, Albert Camus. In Camus’ reckoning, the condemned 
prisoner “is undone by waiting for capital punishment well before 
he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on him, the first being worse than 
the second . . . . Compared to such torture, the penalty of 
retaliation seems like a civilized law.”4 
Drawing on my prior writing on the death penalty, from which 
I borrow liberally, I will dissect the process by which a prisoner 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE: LIFE UNDER 
SENTENCE OF DEATH 99–118 (1981) [hereinafter CONDEMNED TO DIE]; see also 
MARIO HECTOR, DEATH ROW: JAMAICAN PRISON DIARY (1984) (characterizing death 
rows as unremittingly bleak living environments); Lloyd Vogelman, The Living 
Dead: Living on Death Row, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 183, 195 (1989) (“While the 
condemned are [on death row], they are the living dead.”); LISA GUENTHER, SOCIAL 
DEATH AND ITS AFTERLIVES: A CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT 253–56 (2013) (concluding that the “social death of prisoners” 
affects society in its entirety); Diana Peel, Clutching at Life, Waiting to Die: The 
Experience of Death Row Incarceration, W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 61, 69 (Nov. 2013) 
(suggesting that international reforms to the death row appeals process could 
benefit the system in the United States). 
 2. See ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION 
PROCESS 153 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter DEATH WORK] (arguing that the modern 
execution process is an actual, and not merely a metaphorical, example of 
torture). 
 3. See ACLU, A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON DEATH 
ROW 6–7 (2013) (describing the typical “negative physiological and psychological 
reactions” of prolonged solitary confinement). 
 4. ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, 
AND DEATH 205 (1961). 
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dies twice under sentence of death and show how this process 
facilitates executions that are carried out efficiently, with no 
resistance from the typical condemned prisoner.5 In essence, this 
process entails the dehumanization of the prisoner—the death of 
the person’s humanity, which in turn paves the way for passive 
participation in the death of the body carried out in the killing 
process that unfolds in the death chamber.6 I will argue that the 
totality of the experience of prisoners put to death in America 
today necessarily and inevitably entails dehumanization, which I 
contend is at the heart of all forms of torture.7 I conclude that the 
death penalty in practice is a form of torture (exposing condemned 
prisoners to intense suffering in the form of ongoing torment),8 
that it is cruel for Eighth Amendment purposes (failing to meet a 
“carceral burden”9 to respect and protect prisoners, which is 
essential to humane punishment), and that the death penalty is 
therefore in clear violation of the Eighth Amendment.10 
II. Death Row as a Human Warehouse 
There is something basic and timeless about the plight of those 
held captive awaiting execution. The very label, Death Row, is 
evocative. Helen Prejean—noted author of Dead Man Walking—
                                                                                                     
 5. Infra Part II. 
 6. Infra Part III. 
 7. Infra Parts III and IV; see CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at 129 (“[A] 
death sentence amounts to death with torture in a society that has explicitly 
renounced torture as a remnant of barbarism.”); see also DEATH WORK, supra note 
2, at 201–02 (describing death row inmates as “objects” suffering from “personal 
deterioration”). 
 8. Torment is an essential ingredient of torture, as will be elaborated upon 
in this Article. See DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 554 (2007) 
(describing various forms of torture). 
 9. Dolovich establishes that a “carceral duty” to protect and respect 
prisoners is an essential ingredient of just punishment, a point that will be 
elaborated upon later in this article. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison 
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 881–82 
(2009) (stating that the state’s carceral duty includes “an affirmative 
obligation to protect prisoners from serious physical and psychological 
harm”). 
 10. Infra Parts IV and V. 
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upon her first visit to death row, observed: “My stomach can read 
the letters better than my brain.”11 Her stomach can read the 
words better than her brain because she has a “gut feeling of 
empathy evoked by the helplessness and vulnerability of the 
condemned.”12 Michael Lesy reports a similarly basic reaction 
upon visiting death row, falling back on the image of the setting as 
a dungeon for the dispossessed: “The place was a dungeon,” he 
stated, “full of men who were as good as dead.”13 
Death rows, even the best of them, are human warehouses. 
The vast majority of death rows—more than ninety percent by a 
recent count—store condemned prisoners in their solitary cells for 
up to twenty-two hours a day as they await execution.14 Other 
death rows offer what amounts to congregate solitary confinement: 
condemned prisoners are allowed out of their cells, sometimes for 
many hours during the day, but are contained in small groups in 
dayrooms on the pod or tier in which they are housed, in complete 
isolation from the larger prison.15 In earlier research, I described 
one such congregate death row as follows: 
The dayrooms are complete with glass-encased control modules 
that are manned around the clock; these modules supplement 
the bars and locks that keep the dayroom areas securely 
segregated from the rest of the prison. Surveillance is 
unremitting. As a result, the dayrooms serve less as a respite 
from the prisoners’ cells and more as an extension of those cells, 
yielding a kind of group solitary confinement. Movement 
outside the dayrooms is fully controlled at all times, with 
prisoners handcuffed, shackled, and escorted under heavy 
guard. It is as if the prisoners drag the death row environment 
around with them wherever they go, like the chains that bind 
their hands and feet during their rare excursions within the 
                                                                                                     
 11. Robert Johnson & Harmony Davies, Life Under Sentence of Death: 
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE 
ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 661 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 662. 
 14. See ACLU, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that “93 percent of states lock up 
their death row prisoners for 22 or more hours per day”). 
 15. See CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at x–xi (describing congregate 
death rows). 
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prison. Officers and inmates alike describe this death row as a 
cold, lonely, and often frightening world.16 
Life on congregate death rows offers prisoners more time out 
of the cell but nothing of substance to do with that time. The result 
is a numbing regimen of cards, board games, and sometimes 
television viewing, empty exercises that create an environment 
marked by human interaction but no escape from others, either 
officers or fellow condemned prisoners, or from the hopelessness 
that comes with the weight of the death sentence.17 This grim 
world is in some ways hauntingly reminiscent of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s notion “that hell is other people” from whom there is “no 
exit.”18 On a congregate death row, one is trapped with people one 
neither likes nor trusts.19 Yet, each and every day, one must deal 
with them and their concerns, as well as with one’s own growing 
despair in the face of the miserable existence that is life under the 
threat of execution. In the words of one prisoner condemned to this 
congregate hell: 
Not a day passes that I  do not fight just to get out of bed. 
And in the late hours of the night, it takes much strength just 
to keep a grip on my sanity. I have spent many hours, at my 
window, standing on my toilet at the air vent, pleading with 
men who were considering suicide . . .   I have been on that very 
edge myself.20 
This congregate death row, much like its solitary counterpart, is “a 
psychological nightmare that very few survive.”21 
I will focus here on solitary confinement death rows, the more 
common form, but it is crucial to note that all death rows offer 
prisoners a species of dead time: The death row confinement 
regime, whatever its details, offers no life to speak of, only an 
isolated world devoid of purpose or meaning other than waiting for 
the executioner. My research has led me to conclude that death 
rows may differ in the details of their administration, but no death 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1.  
 18. NO EXIT & THREE OTHER PLAYS 47 (1955). 
 19. See generally CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1. 
 20. Id. at x–xi. 
 21. Id. at x. 
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row, solitary or congregate, offers its inmates a round of activity 
that might in any way prepare them for the ordeal they must 
face.22 In this basic and profound sense, all condemned prisoners 
are warehoused for death.23 Moreover, as executions approach, 
condemned prisoners are moved from death row to the death 
house, to undergo especially close custody during a process called 
the death watch, which occurs during the final days and hours 
before a prisoner is put to death.24 A rigid, solitary-confinement 
regimen marked by constant and unremitting surveillance is 
universally imposed during the deathwatch.25 Thus it can be said 
that condemned prisoners live—metaphorically if not literally, in 
solitary cells or in solitary pods, and finally in the death house—in 
the shadow of executions.26  
                                                                                                     
 22. See generally DEATH WORK, supra note 2. 
 23. Condemned prisoners in Missouri are held in general maximum-security 
housing in Potosi Correctional Center rather than on a separate death row. Death 
row confinement would be classified as “supermaximum confinement” by 
comparison. See Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy & Jon R. Sorensen, 
Wasted Resources and Gratuitous Suffering: The Failure of a Security Rationale 
for Death Row, 22 PSYCH., PUB. POL. & LAW 185, 185 (2016) (discussing the 
differences in death row confinement). For further discussion of the confinement 
of condemned prisoners in Missouri and also North Carolina, which offers a 
similar regime, see CELINA ALDAPE ET AL., RETHINKING “DEATH ROW”: VARIATIONS 
IN THE HOUSING OF INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED TO DEATH 8 (2016), 
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Liman/deathrow_ 
reportfinal.pdf (comparing housing arrangements of death-sentenced prisoners in 
North Carolina, Missouri, and Colorado). Maximum-security prisons offer more 
options for living than can be found on death rows, but these prisons, like death 
rows, offer no meaningful preparation for the threat of execution under which 
condemned prisoners live. Most maximum-security prisons, not unlike death 
rows, are human warehouses in their own right, though less repressive and 
dehumanizing human warehouses than those typically found on death row. See 
ROBERT JOHNSON, ANN MARIE ROCHELEAU & ALISON B. MARTIN, HARD TIME: A 
FRESH LOOK AT UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE PRISON (forthcoming 2017) 
(discussing conditions of maximum-security prisons) (on file with author). 
 24. See Johnson & Davies, supra note 11, at 669 (describing death row 
confinement as “expressly undertaken as confinement in preparation for 
execution”). 
 25. See generally JOSEPH B. INGLE, THE INFERNO: A SOUTHERN MORALITY 
TALE (2012); DEATH WORK, supra note 2. 
 26. See generally INGLE, supra note 25; see also CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra 
note 1, at 80–98 (discussing the contemplative state of inmates awaiting 
execution). 
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An execution is a state-sponsored homicide—“a killing of one 
human being”—the condemned prisoner—“by another”—the 
executioner or, more typically these days, the correctional officers 
who make up the execution team.27 No death row is or has ever 
been organized to prepare prisoners for the traumatic experience 
of living under the threat of death by homicide and then 
submitting to that killing at the hands of a team of prison officers. 
This, in plain view of one or more groups of witnesses, all occurs in 
the context of an impersonal ritual in which the violence of 
execution unfolds according to a protocol that amounts to a killing 
script. This killing script is captured in the Death Row Diary of 
William Van Poyck, who was executed by the State of Florida on 
June 12, 2013: 
Watching Elmer [Carroll] go through his final days really drove 
home how ritualized this whole process has become; the ritual 
aspect perhaps brings some numbing comfort—or sense of 
purpose—to those not really comfortable with this whole killing 
people scheme. This is akin to participating in a play where the 
participants step to a rote cadence, acting out their parts in the 
script, with nobody pausing to question the underlying premise. 
It’s like a Twilight Zone episode where you want to grab 
someone, shake them hard, and yell “Hey, wake up! Don't you 
know what’s going on here?!!!”28 
No death row is or ever has been organized to prepare 
prisoners for the moments of ersatz decency, seen most clearly in 
last meals and last words, which offer breaks in the killing routine 
but also are evidence of breathtaking hypocrisy. The hard truth is 
that for years, even decades, condemned prisoners are fed on swill 
and denied any voice whatsoever in their daily lives. Then, on the 
threshold of execution, the state pays attention to the prisoners as 
individuals—typically offering special last meals, always 
encouraging last words, sometimes extending a gentle hand to help 
the prisoner in his last walk to the death chamber—the implication 
being that justice is meted out by compassionate, caring 
                                                                                                     
 27. See DEATH WORK, supra note 2, at 123–41 (discussing modern execution 
teams). 
 28. William Van Poyck, DEATH ROW DIARY (June 25, 2013, 4:57 PM), 
http://deathrowdiary.blogspot.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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professionals who kill reluctantly, and impersonally, in the service 
of justice.29  
The condemned on death row, then, are held in a sort of 
existential limbo—a place offering a life on the barest terms, at 
once a sterile, repetitive, empty existence; and a death framed in 
the menacing guise of a homicide dressed up as justice. As noted 
earlier, some death row inmates characterize their existence as a 
living death and themselves as the living dead.30 The imagery of 
living death, in my view, offers an appropriate description of the 
human experience in a world where life is so obviously ruled by 
death. This deeply compelling image, I contend, captures the 
fundamentals of life under sentence of death: the condemned 
prisoners’ profound deprivation of personal autonomy and control 
over resources critical to psychological survival; their suspension 
in a stark, empty, tomblike setting, a sort of dead zone that is 
utterly indifferent to basic human needs and desires; and their 
enforced isolation from the living, with the resulting “emotional 
emptiness and death” that is a hallmark of dehumanization.31 
My research on the experiences of prisoners on death row and 
in the death house supports the proposition that the condemned 
have, as a general rule, died psychologically before they are 
physically put to death.32 These prisoners, today as in past 
centuries, take their last walks as defeated creatures, effectively 
beyond resistance.33 This death before execution, if you will, would 
                                                                                                     
 29. See generally Linda Ross Meyer, The Meaning of Death: Last Words, Last 
Meals, in WHO DESERVES TO DIE: CONSTRUCTING THE EXECUTABLE SUBJECT 176 
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011); Joanna Heaney, Too Little, Too Late, 6 
BLEAKHOUSE REV. 15 (2013); Robert Johnson et al., Death Row Confinement and 
the Meaning of Last Words, 3 LS. 141 (2014); Michael Owen Jones, Dining on 
Death Row and the Crutch of Ritual, 127 J. AM. FOLKLORE 3 (2014); Daniel 
LaChance, Last Words, Last Meals, and Last Stands: Agency and Individuality 
in the Modern Execution Process, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 701 (2007). 
 30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing life as the living 
dead). 
 31. See sources cited supra note 29 (discussing states’ dehumanizing 
techniques). 
 32. See Johnson & Davies, supra note 11, at 662 (describing this 
phenomenon as “dehumanization”). 
 33. See DEATH WORK, supra note 2, at 143 (discussing the defeated nature of 
death row inmates); see generally SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, CONDEMNED: INSIDE THE 
SING SING DEATH HOUSE (2000).  
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seem to be the case regardless of the particulars of the penal 
regime, the execution process, or, indeed, the prisoner 
population.34  
A regimen of solitary confinement has been and remains the 
central characteristic of life under sentence of death.35 For the 
death row prisoner, more than any other category of inmate, being 
alone—and being lonely, even when in the presence of others—is a 
central and perhaps even defining fact of existence: “No one really 
knows what loneliness is until they come to the row,” observed one 
condemned prisoner.36 “On the row a person feels lost in deep 
despair. You feel no one will ever be able to help you. All is lost.”37 
Death row is the extreme case of the pain and deprivation of 
prison, an existential vacuum, the prison’s prison. 
The empty existence offered to death row prisoners is reflected 
in the objective conditions of their confinement. “Most death row 
prisoners in the United States,”—we learn from a recent national 
survey—“are locked alone in small cells for 22 to 24 hours a day 
with little human contact or interaction.”38 Sterility is a salient 
feature of these regimes, where there is “reduced or no natural 
light” as well as “severe constraints on visitation, including the 
inability to ever touch friends or loved ones.”39 The limited and 
limiting life on death row is the core of the prisoner’s existence; 
“An overwhelming majority of states do not allow death row 
prisoners to have access to work or employment opportunities, or 
provide access to educational or vocational programming of any 
kind.”40 Eight in ten death rows “allow only one hour or less of 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Johnson and Davies, supra note 11, at 663 (describing those 
condemned prisoners as being “already half dead”). 
 35. As noted earlier, most death rows—over ninety percent, by one recent 
count—impose what amounts to round-the-clock storage in a cramped, barren, 
single-person prison cell. See ACLU, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that “93 percent 
of states lock up their death row prisoners for 22 or more hours per day”). 
 36. WELCOME TO HELL: LETTERS AND WRITINGS FROM DEATH ROW 44 (Jan 
Arriens ed., 1997). 
 37. Id. 
 38. ACLU, supra note 3, at 2. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 5. 
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exercise daily for death row prisoners.”41 These brief respites from 
the solitary regime are commonly taken in “a cage, pen, or cell” in 
which there typically is no “exercise equipment, or even a simple 
ball to bounce up and down.”42 The result is a regimen of human 
storage apart from the larger prison and outside world in which 
“many prisoners will go years without access to fresh air or 
sunshine.”43 
The trend on death rows today is toward increased isolation 
and control in those states where executions occur with any 
regularity.44 Texas, Florida, Virginia, and Oklahoma are the top 
four execution states as of this writing.45 Together, they account 
for roughly two-thirds of all executions carried out since the 
executions commenced in 1977.46 The death rows in these states 
are especially repressive, featuring undiluted regimes of solitary 
confinement.47 Texas, which accounts for over 500 executions since 
the return of the death penalty in 1976—the most of any state—
has a death row that offers “the most cell time and the fewest 
amenities” of any death row in the nation: “23 hours a day in the 
cell, no TV, solitary exercise, no work, and no programs.”48 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Johnson & Davies, supra note 11, at 668–69 (listing nine general 
conclusions that apply to most condemned prisoners in the United States).  
 45. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-
region-1976 (last updated July 15, 2016) (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. Johnson & Davies, supra note 11, at 668. 
 47. See id. (discussing the severe examples of solitary confinement on death 
rows in the United States). States with less active death penalties, in which years 
or even decades may pass between executions, typically have confinement 
regimes that are less repressive. See id. (noting, however, that some of these 
states still retain repressive regimes mimicking solitary confinement). Some offer 
what I have termed congregate solitary confinement, allowing condemned 
prisoners more time out of the cell and more human contact with other condemned 
prisoners but no contact with the larger prison, from which they are strictly 
isolated (examples at the time of this writing would include North Carolina and 
Utah). See generally Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Men of a Thousand Days: Death-
Sentenced Inmates at Utah State Prison (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wales, Bangor) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 48. Johnson & Davies, supra note 11, at F669; see also Dave Mann, Solitary 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT UNTIL DEATH 1223 
In addition to more repressive regimes in high-execution 
states, stays on death row are much longer than in any time in 
history. Justice Breyer, in Glossip v. Gross,49 cites compelling 
statistics: “In 2014, 35 individuals were executed. Those 
executions occurred, on average, nearly 18 years after a court 
initially pronounced its sentence of death.”50 Remarkably, 
Breyer reports, that “[i]n some death penalty States, the average 
delay is longer. In an oral argument last year, for example, the 
State admitted that the last 10 prisoners executed in Florida 
had spent an average of nearly 25 years on death row before 
execution.”51 Breyer notes that these lengthy stays—new in 
human experience with executions—are significant because they 
subject “death row inmates to decades of especially severe, 
dehumanizing conditions of confinement.”52 At least two legal 
scholars have argued that extended stays on death row are, in and 
of themselves, violations of the Eighth Amendment.53 
III. Death Row Confinement Is Objectively Dehumanizing 
Death row confinement, which I have indicated is best 
described as solitary confinement in service of death by state-
sponsored homicide, is dehumanizing because the conditions of 
this confinement violate essential elements of human nature and 
                                                                                                     
Men, OBSERVER (Nov. 10, 2010, 7:01 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/solitary-
men/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (discussing the negative effects of prolonged 
isolation on death row inmates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 49. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).  
 50. Id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 2765. 
 53. See Kathleen M. Flynn, Note, The “Agony of Suspense”: How Protracted 
Death Row Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291, 293 (1997) (arguing that 
“execution after protracted death row confinement violates the Eighth 
Amendment”); see also Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death 
Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 147, 151 (1998) (arguing that an “inordinate delay between a death 
sentence and execution may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment”). 
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therefore are violations of the human dignity shared by all human 
beings by virtue of their status as human beings. What are the 
essential elements of human dignity that are violated? My claim is 
that, in essence, human dignity boils down to the right to live as a 
human being.54 Do condemned prisoners live on death row and in 
the death house as human beings? That question can be answered 
by spelling out the essential elements of human nature and 
determining whether these elements are respected in the 
experiences of condemned prisoners.  
I have argued that the essence of personhood or humanity is a 
sense of identity or self that conveys the capacity and confers the 
moral right to make choices and hence be self-determining.55 To be 
sure, self-determination is not an absolute; full self-determination 
is probably impossible in this world, but some degree of self-
determination is required for the person to live as a human being. 
It has been my contention that self-determination, in whatever 
degree and form it exists in a given environment, is achieved in the 
world of other human beings through a process of self-defining 
social interactions.56 These interactions, in my assessment, require 
some degree of autonomy, security, and relatedness to others.57 
In making these assertions, I understand autonomy to mean 
the capacity to influence one’s environment and hence exert some 
modicum of control over the conditions of one’s existence. I 
understand security to mean shelter from harm, which entails 
some element of social stability; secure and safe, one is defined in 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, 
Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 583, 586 (2014) (arguing that respecting a human’s dignity “comes down to 
acknowledging their humanity, a humanity shared by all human beings by virtue 
of being human beings”).  
 55. See Robert Johnson & Chris Miller, An Eighth Amendment Analysis of 
Juvenile Life Without Parole: Extending Graham to All Juvenile Offenders, 12 U. 
MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 101, 112 (2012) (“A person or human 
being has inherent self-worth that is the source of human dignity.”). 
 56. See Johnson, supra note 54, at 585 (“Self-determination is necessarily 
achieved in the world of other human beings through a process of self-defining 
social interactions.”). 
 57. See id. (“We are born into a society composed of others who, like 
ourselves, possess the capacity for autonomous thought and action, and who must 
be seen and treated as intrinsically equal in kind and value to use because they 
are fellow human beings.”). 
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some measure by one’s choices rather than by the vagaries of one’s 
environment. Relatedness or connectedness to others entails the 
ability to feel for oneself and others and hence to have caring and 
constructive relationships in which other human beings are seen 
as persons in their own right.58 Autonomy, security, and 
relatedness to others develop in interaction with one another as 
individuals become persons.59 The process of becoming a person is 
never fully finished, however, as “man’s nature is a self-surpassing 
and a self-transcending one.”60 We are, then, emergent persons. 
The element of growth is thus a part of our nature and must be 
respected, even in the context of punishment.61 
It has been my contention that “our understanding of what it 
means to be a human being—to appreciate our own humanity and 
that of others—creates a bright line distinction: while 
punishments can legitimately deprive persons of their liberty, they 
cannot degrade them by ignoring or violating their essential 
human dignity.”62 With even the worst criminals, it must be 
recognized that they, like all human beings, “feel and think as we 
do” and, further, that “our inner feelings are alike in some 
fundamental fashion” that marks us, criminal and non-criminal 
alike, as fellow human beings.63 This line of reasoning has led a 
colleague and me to conclude that “[l]ike us, other human beings, 
even criminals, must be seen as autonomous entities, separate and 
                                                                                                     
 58. See Johnson & Miller, supra note 55, at 112–13 (defining relatedness as 
one of three components of humanity). 
 59. See DEATH WORK, supra note 2, at 205 (contending that to be 
self-determining, individuals must influence their environment). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN 
PUNISHMENT 222–24 (2014) (discussing an incentive structure based on the 
recognition of the innate human need for personal growth); LUC FERRY, A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF THOUGHT: A PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDE TO LIVING 112–14 (2011) (“[N]o 
essence predetermines it, no programme can ever succeed in entirely hemming it 
in; no system can imprison it so absolutely that it cannot emancipate itself . . . . 
The human individual is free: endlessly improvable, and in no sense programmed 
by characteristics supposedly linked to race or gender.”). 
 62. Johnson & Miller, supra note 55, at 112.  
 63. Id. at 113. 
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protected in [their] separation from others, as we know ourselves 
to be separate and protected in our separation from others.”64 
The notion that human beings are “separate and protected in 
[their] separation from others” goes to the integrity of the human 
self or identity. By definition, some degree of separation from the 
social world—of self and society—is required for the formation of 
an individual human identity. It is no accident that all known 
societies honor “the social institution of privacy”65 or its functional 
equivalent, which is to say, some social practice that offers 
separation or insulation of the person from the surrounding 
environment, such that actions can be, at least in some measure, 
self-generated rather than externally determined.66 Insulation 
from the world, I have argued, confers and confirms selfhood and 
permits individual selves to become persons—that is, to negotiate 
their lives with some degree of autonomy, security, and relatedness 
to others.67 Condemned prisoners cannot insulate themselves from 
an environment in which they are denied privacy and subjected to 
total control.68 
Some degree of privacy and hence control of one’s life is 
possible in most regular prisons, including maximum-security 
prisons, where inmates typically have some free time to 
themselves, and hence can escape the reaches of prison 
surveillance and form a subculture that offers some shelter from 
the larger institutional world.69 Individual prisoners typically can 
carve out “niches,” sheltered spaces and routines that offer them 
insulation from the mainline prison.70 Control of one’s daily round 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. (citation omitted). 
 65. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 26, 39 n.10 (1976). See generally LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CONDITION OF MAN 
(1944). 
 66. See generally MUMFORD, supra note 65. 
 67. See DEATH WORK, supra note 2, at 206 (describing privacy as a “social 
skin”). 
 68. See generally CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1; DEATH WORK, supra note 
2. 
 69. See generally Ben Crewe, The Sociology of Imprisonment, in HANDBOOK 
ON PRISONS (Yvonne Jewkes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2016). 
 70. See HANS TOCH, LIVING IN PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SURVIVAL 38 (1992) 
(discussing prison ecology, including a consideration of niches). See generally 
JOHNSON, ROCHELEAU, & MARTIN, supra note 23. There is no research that 
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of life is impossible on death row, and especially in the death house. 
It is my contention that, absent privacy and control, the 
condemned prisoner cannot establish an existence separate from 
the environment. Without a separate existence, one is exposed and 
hence vulnerable to contamination of one’s self, if not indeed 
dissolution of that self, leaving in its wake a damaged person who 
is in some objective sense less than human—in my terms, 
objectively dehumanized. Note that death row confinement, as a 
profoundly isolating human warehouse, renders prisoners 
powerless, vulnerable, and alone.71 This confinement violates each 
and every element of human dignity as I have defined it and is, by 
its very nature, profoundly and objectively dehumanizing.72 
IV. Death Row Confinement Is a Form of Torture 
Is the typical experience of condemned prisoners in America 
today, which I have termed solitary confinement in service of death 
by state-sponsored homicide, a case of torture? If so, is the 
suffering entailed in this confinement cruel in the Eighth 
Amendment sense of the term? I will argue that the answer to both 
these questions is yes—that death row brings in its wake an 
objective dehumanization of the person that is the hallmark of 
torture, and that this torture is cruel in a way that violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
In Darius Rejali’s masterful work on torture, Torture and 
Democracy, the essence of torture is boiled down to this 
proposition: 
                                                                                                     
suggests that niches have been or could be developed on death row or in the death 
house. Cohen has proposed segregated settings that offer “insulation, not 
isolation,” but this would entail major reforms that would be hard to implement 
on death row and even harder to preserve in the face of executions. See Fred 
Cohen, Isolation in Penal Settings: The Isolation-Restraint Paradigm, 22 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 295, 322 (2006) (arguing that “with a disturbed or disruptive 
inmate a form of insulation, not isolation, may be required”). Nothing resembling 
niches was uncovered in my research on death row or the death house. See 
generally CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1; DEATH WORK, supra note 2. 
 71. See CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at 17 (describing the central 
psychological features of a death row inmate as “powerlessness, fear, and 
emotional emptiness”). 
 72. See id. (describing the “emotional death” of a death row inmate). 
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In each case one must inquire whether physical torment is 
involved, whether the individual is helpless and detained, 
whether the agents who practice it are state or quasi-state 
officials, and whether it is put toward public purposes. If the 
answer in each case is yes, then it is torture, regardless of what 
it is called.73  
This definition is correct, in my view, but limiting suffering to 
physical torment is needlessly restrictive. In the United Nations 
Declaration against Torture, torture “means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental”74 is inflicted. 
More importantly, the distinction between physical and 
psychological torment is arbitrary and inaccurate. Any experience 
of torment will necessarily merge physical and psychological 
elements: emotional pain (sometimes called “social” or 
“psychological” pain), such as occurs in the wake of social exclusion 
or personal rejection, “activates the same brain regions as physical 
pain.”75 Physical pain brings with it a psychological component and 
indeed the reverse is true as well: psychological pain brings with it 
a physical component.  
An instructive case in point is the experience of dread—
continuing and substantial fear and anxiety—which is the 
overarching personal experience of condemned prisoners, 
particularly as their executions draw near.76 Note the dread, fear, 
and anxiety in the account of two typical death row prisoners when 
merely “thinking about the death penalty”: 
When that sentence comes across my mind, that brings a 
quite a bit of fear. It brings quite a bit of fear and worry, you 
know . . . causes the person to pace back and forth, become 
nervous, you know. Can’t sit down. It’s hard for such a person 
to sleep. This happens to me at times. The fact that my 
                                                                                                     
 73. REJALI, supra note 8, at 554. 
 74. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 75. Christopher Bergland, The Neuroscience of Social Pain, PSYCHOL. TODAY, 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-athletes-way/201403/the-
neuroscience-social-pain (last updated Mar. 3, 2014) (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 76. See CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at 80 (“For some prisoners, even 
thinking about the death sentence can aggravate fears and set in motion an 
obsessive reaction bordering on anxious panic.”). 
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sentence might not get commuted or the death penalty might 
not be thrown out. This causes me to grow nervous. Can’t 
sleep. You are full of anxiety and really it’s insanity.77 
I go to sleep and I dream of me sitting down in that chair. I 
mean it’s such a fearful thought. Me walking down the tier, 
sitting down in it, them hooking it up and turning it on . . . . I 
don’t know. I can wake up, my heart’s beating fast, I’m 
sweating like hell, just like I rinsed my head in water . . . . I 
feel I’m gonna have a heart attack.78 
Fear and anxiety are experienced as mental or psychological in 
origin, but it is apparent in the statements of these condemned 
prisoners that these emotions have bodily consequences: disrupted 
sleep, drained energy, and physical exhaustion.79  
On death row, the daily regime highlights one’s vulnerability, 
which reinforces fears and anxieties. Some of the elements of life 
on death row that highlight one’s vulnerability are physical. The 
prisoner is alone in a cage, physically constrained and, like the 
proverbial sitting duck, defenseless against insult or attack in an 
environment in which they are under the total control of officers, 
some of whom, in the words of one condemned prisoner, “take it 
upon themselves to be your judge and your jury and your 
executioner.”80 When moved from that cage, the prisoner is 
typically stripped and searched, then heavily (and often painfully) 
restrained in handcuffs and leg irons that chaff and bruise and cut 
the skin in varying degrees.81 Even medical care can be a painful 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. (quoting a death row prisoner in Alabama). 
 78. Id. at 88 (quoting a death row prisoner in Alabama). 
 79. See id. at 116 (describing the physical side effects of fear and anxiety). 
The experience of condemned prisoners seems to parallel that of persons who 
suffer from general anxiety disorder, with the difference being that their anxieties 
are triggered by widely shared perceptions of the environment. “Hans Toch has 
described prison as ‘impersonal enough to help a man suspect that others 
want him dead.’ Such suspicions become self-evident truths on death row, 
where prison policy uniformly ‘reflects that [we] prisoners are already 
doomed and forgotten.’” Id. at 116 (quoting Hans Toch). In the death row 
context, the essentially accurate perception that prisoners “are already doomed 
and forgotten,” in the words of one such prisoner, translates into a life on the 
knife-edge of dread. Id. See generally INGLE, supra note 25. 
 80. CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at 66.  
 81. See id. (discussing the painful process of moving death row inmates). 
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and degrading routine for condemned prisoners. Von Poyck reports 
that a fellow death row prisoner seeking dental care was  
forced to lay on his back, reclined, in the dentist’s chair for two 
hours with his hands handcuffed behind his back with the ‘black 
box’ on (a very painful device which locks your hands rigidly in 
place in the handcuffs) . . . . When [the prisoner] returned to his 
cell his extreme distress was evident and when the cuffs were 
removed and he tried to move his arms in front of him he found 
one of his shoulders was dislocated. His wrists were red, swollen 
and completely numb. Somehow he managed to pop his 
shoulder back in place.82  
However inured some prisoners may become to the degrading 
and often painful treatment that is common in close confinement, 
these abuses almost certainly live on in their awareness as 
reminders of their helplessness and vulnerability at the hands of 
their keepers.83 In a frightening sense, death row is sufficiently 
isolated that—as a practical matter—it is law unto itself.84 The 
vulnerability this image of lawlessness implies is very much on the 
minds of condemned prisoners.85 Life in solitary confinement 
under a sentence of death is a torment, pure and simple. 
The remaining elements of torture in Rejali’s definition are 
self-evidently true in the case of death row.86 I contend that, given 
the conditions of confinement on death row as examined in this 
essay, condemned prisoners are “helpless and detained,” which is 
the essential reality of death row confinement; the correctional 
officers who supervise condemned prisoners, as well as the officers 
that carry out their executions, are “state or quasi-state officials.” 
I contend that the confinement regime serves “public purposes”: 
the facilitation of executions by the imposition of a regime that 
                                                                                                     
 82. DEATH ROW DIARY, supra note 28. 
 83. See, e.g., CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at 66 (describing that some 
prison guards take on the roles of judge, jury, and executioner). 
 84. See id. (“Paradoxically, death row is a lawless world, or, perhaps more 
properly, it is a law unto itself.”). 
 85. See generally CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1. 
 86. See REJALI, supra note 8, at 554 (describing various forms of torture and 
torment). 
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dehumanizes the prisoners, rendering them, virtually without 
exception, passive participants in the execution process.87 
Rejali’s definition of torture is consistent in its essentials with 
that offered by the United Nations. In the United Nations 
Declaration against Torture, torture  
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the 
instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, 
punishing him for an act he has committed, or intimidating him 
or other persons . . . .88 
Here, intimidation would be the link to dehumanization and its 
usefulness on death row. The intimidating, dread-producing death 
row regimen is the leading edge of the dehumanization process. 
The UN definition of torture excludes “pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions.”89 
This would seem to mean that death row cannot be a form of 
torture because it is undertaken pursuant to a lawful 
punishment—the death penalty. This is a logical fallacy. Any 
punishment that involves torturous conditions in its 
administration is no longer a lawful punishment. As Rejali notes 
                                                                                                     
 87. There are, to my knowledge, one or perhaps two prisoners who have 
physically resisted the execution process since the return of the modern death 
penalty with the 1977 execution of Gary Gilmore. Gilmore dropped his appeals 
and, in effect, volunteered to be executed. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 
1013–14 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (describing Gilmore’s opposition of 
others trying to intervene on his behalf). Over ten percent of executions involve 
volunteers. John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and 
Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 940 (2005). Oppressive death row conditions and 
the dreary prospect of a life sentence in the event that one’s death penalty is 
overturned are factors that influence some, perhaps many of these decisions, as 
alluded to by Justice Breyer in Glossip when he observed: “given the negative 
effects of confinement and uncertainty, it is not surprising that many inmates 
volunteer to be executed, abandoning further appeals . . . . Nor is it surprising 
that many inmates consider, or commit, suicide.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 
2726, 2766 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally John H. Blume, Killing 
the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005); 
Robert Johnson et al., Autonomy in Extremis: An Intelligent Waiver of Appeals on 
Death Row, 39 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 787 (2014). 
 88. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 74.  
 89. Id.  
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acerbically, “the fact that a practice is legally authorized does not 
magically transform the practice into ‘not torture’ any more than 
magic words uttered over an ass change it into a Ferrari.”90 Torture 
must be defined independently of law. To hold otherwise is to 
contend that anything can be done to persons under color of law. 
My research has led me to conclude that standard instances of 
torture and death row confinement have in common an assault on 
persons that both causes intense suffering and violates their 
integrity as human beings by treating them as if they were mere 
animals or objects.91 The death row regime—particularly during 
the crucial deathwatch period—incorporates many of the standard 
elements of torturous confinement: total control of basic life 
activities by essentially “omnipotent” keepers, who can neglect or 
abuse prisoners, sometimes at will, often with little or no 
accountability; isolation of condemned prisoners—either singly or 
as a group, for years on end and, increasingly, for a decade or 
more—from the larger prison and from the outside world, with only 
limited contact with other human beings in a carefully monitored 
and controlled environment; chronic uncertainty about one’s fate—
uncertainty which, like death row confinement itself, extends for 
years, leaving prisoners preoccupied about if and when they will 
be executed (a morbid reality brought home to them vividly by 
executions stayed at the final hour), and about what the experience 
of execution will be; a situation of personal humiliation, because 
the prisoners are, in effect, objects—mere “parcel[s]” or 
“thing[s]”92—stored for execution, itself an exercise in humiliation; 
and, in varying degrees, personal deterioration, if not debilitation 
and exhaustion, in the existentially Spartan regime that is death 
row confinement.93 All of this occurs in the context of a barren and 
impoverished setting marked by physically and psychologically 
painful conditions. 
                                                                                                     
 90. REJALI, supra note 8, at 554. 
 91. See CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at 129 (noting the ironic 
conclusion that a death sentence amounts to torture even though our society 
has explicitly renounced torture). 
 92. CAMUS, supra note 4, at 201. 
 93. See DEATH WORK, supra note 2, at 201–02 (describing the different 
features of death row as tortuous confinement). 
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It is certainly true that suffering on death row stems primarily 
from what psychologists would call “psychological maltreatment” 
(defined as “emotional abuse or emotional neglect”) rather than 
overt physical abuse.94 Here it is wise to remember that the 
emotional traumas associated with emotional abuse can be as 
harmful, and sometimes more harmful, than physical abuse: 
neglect, which yields depression and anxiety stemming from 
“unseen wounds,” arguably tears at the foundation of the self in a 
uniquely pernicious way.95 The very authenticity of one’s suffering 
is cast into doubt in the wake of neglect, since the source of 
suffering and indeed the damage it produces are hidden from 
view.96 It is likely that the suffering attendant to emotional abuse 
and neglect on death row is not inflicted expressly because its 
effects are intended or useful, as one finds in much torture and as 
seen in the UN definition of torture.97 Nevertheless, this suffering 
is known to exist, and is exploited because its effects are useful in 
facilitating executions that go off smoothly, without resistance 
from condemned prisoners.98  
                                                                                                     
 94. See Emotional Abuse: Definitions, Signs, Symptoms, Examples, HEALTHY 
PLACE, http://www.healthyplace.com/abuse/emotional-psychological-abuse/emotional-
abuse-definitions-signs-symptoms-examples/ (last updated July 18, 2016) (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016) (“Emotional abuse can happen to anyone at any time in their 
lives, . . . which can have devastating consequences on relationships and all those 
involved. Just because there is no physical mark doesn’t mean the abuse isn’t real 
and isn’t a problem or even a crime in some countries.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 95. See id. (discussing signs of emotional abuse). 
 96. See Childhood Psychological Abuse as Harmful as Sexual or Physical 
Abuse, AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.apa.org/news/press/ 
releases/2014/10/psychological-abuse.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (“Children 
who are emotionally abused and neglected face similar and sometimes worse 
mental health problems as children who are physically or sexually abused.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The same holds for adults. See 
Effects of Emotional Abuse on Adults, HEALTHY PLACE, 
http://www.healthyplace.com/abuse/emotional-psychological-abuse/effects-of-
emotional-abuse-on-adults/ (last updated July 18, 2016) (last visited Sept. 8, 
2016) (“Make no mistake about it; the effects of emotional abuse can be just as 
severe as those from physical abuse.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 97. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 74. 
 98. See generally DEATH WORK, supra note 2. 
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Whatever the precise origin of the suffering on death row, 
execution team officers recognize the dehumanization process at 
work, watch it unfold, and knowingly benefit from it.99 Officers 
offer firsthand accounts of the dehumanization of the prisoners, 
describing prisoners on the threshold of execution as defeated, 
demoralized, and compliant figures in the killing process:  
His mind goes first . . . . All resistance disappears, they’re 
exhausted. I think he makes it up in his mind then, you know, 
that he’s ready to go. He blocks everything out, you know, as far 
as where I’m gonna be tomorrow, what I’m gonna do, you know. 
I know what I’ve got to do. There’s no more pain, no more 
sorrow. I’m going. And that’s it, gonna get it over with. I don’t 
have to fight the lawyers and the judges and the courts no more. 
They work it out in their minds and they accept it . . . . A lot of 
‘em die in their minds . . . . I’ve never known of one or heard of 
one putting up a fight . . . . By the time they [take that last] 
walk . . . they’ve completely faced it. Such a reality most people 
can’t understand. ‘Cause they don’t fight it. They don’t seem to 
have anything to say. It’s just something like “Get it over with.” 
They may be, they may be numb, sort of. 
They go through stages. And at this stage, they’re real humble. 
Humblest bunch of people I ever seen. Most all of ‘em is real, 
real weak. Most of the time, you’d only need one or two people 
to carry out an execution, as weak and as humble as they are. 
They’re really a humble bunch of people.100  
It is telling that observations by execution team officers about 
the passivity of the prisoners they encounter in the death house 
dovetail with the observations of the French existentialist Albert 
Camus. Decades earlier, and in reference to an execution process 
that culminated in beheading at the guillotine, Camus described 
the condemned as “no longer a man but a thing waiting to be 
handled by the executioners.”101 
Death row prisoners, moreover, are exposed to dehumanizing 
conditions that will typically, if not inevitably, produce a torturous 
regime. Moral restraints against brutality, including torture, are 
                                                                                                     
 99. See id. at 156 (discussing the manner in which execution team officers 
are involved in the execution process). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
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compromised when officials are authorized to harm, when the 
procedures that give rise to harm are made routine, and when 
prospective victims of harm are dehumanized.102 These conditions 
clearly apply on death row. Correctional officers responsible for 
death row are explicitly and unambiguously authorized to 
warehouse prisoners awaiting execution. Officers and their 
superiors can readily view themselves as impersonal instruments 
of authority; as such, they bear no individual moral responsibility 
for the actions necessary to maintain an orderly death row or for 
the executions that may take place under their auspices. And since 
routine is almost blindly relied upon to structure each day, and 
especially each execution day, correctional personnel are further 
removed from the human consequences of the policies they 
implement. Indeed, a preoccupation with routine generates 
enthusiasm to achieve technical proficiency at the various tasks 
attendant to death work and discourages more thoughtful 
examination of the nature and import of these activities. Finally, 
death row inmates are effectively isolated from one another and 
the larger world, and hence are denied the personal and group 
support necessary to retain their autonomy in the face of 
overwhelming authority, a suffocating routine, and a degrading 
existence. Thus, the dehumanization of condemned prisoners 
emerges as the culmination of instruments of authority acting 
within stipulated routines on condemned prisoners rendered as 
objects to be stored and ultimately dispatched in the execution 
chamber.103 Persons engaged in death work, in other words, are 
strongly predisposed to treat the condemned as already dead or 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Robert Johnson, Institutions and the Promotion of Violence, in 
VIOLENT TRANSACTIONS: THE LIMITS OF PERSONALITY 181, 181–205 (A. Campbell & 
J.J. Gibbs, eds., 1986) (comparing adjustment dynamics of modern corrections 
officers to prison guards at Auschwitz, particularly in regards to the methods they 
use to cope with the daily routine of violence); see also CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra 
note, at 130 (describing how the daily routine of life on death row enables 
corrections officers to see themselves as impersonal, autonomous figures of 
justice). 
 103. See CONDEMNED TO DIE, supra note 1, at 130 (noting how daily 
procedures enable corrections officers to take satisfaction in their work, since 
human nature derives a natural sense of pleasure from the successful completion 
of routines). 
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dying—as the living death suffered by death row prisoners so 
vividly attests. 
V. Death Row Confinement Is Cruel in the Eighth Amendment 
Sense of the Term 
Does death row confinement as described here violate the 
Eight Amendment? It is customary in Eight Amendment 
jurisprudence to separate the conditions of confinement from the 
punishment, whether that punishment is a prison term or a death 
sentence.104 This separation confuses matters, we learn from 
Dolovich, because the experience of a prison term (and, by 
implication, a death sentence) is directly related to the conditions 
of confinement under which the sentence is served.105 A reasonable 
person would stipulate that a life sentence in a brutal prison is a 
more punishing experience than a life term in a safe prison that is 
replete with programs and services that offer the possibility of 
personal growth and rehabilitation.106 Likewise, a reasonable 
person would stipulate that a sentence of death preceded by years 
of solitary confinement on death row, with the threat of 
degradation and deterioration, is more punishing than a sentence 
of death served in a more accommodating prison setting where 
programs and opportunities for personal development are present, 
offering at least the prospect of a death that unfolds in some 
measure on the terms of the individual prisoner.107  
                                                                                                     
 104. See Dolovich, supra note 9, at 890 (discussing the separation of death row 
confinement from punishment). As the Farmer [v. Brennan] Court put it, “[t]he 
Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws 
cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’’’ 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). And, the Court found, 
prison conditions not explicitly authorized by the statute or the sentencing judge 
qualify as punishment only if some prison official actually knew of and 
disregarded the risk of harm. Id.   
 105. See id. at 885–86 (noting how different factors must be considered when 
the prison conditions are challenged as being cruel and unusual, as opposed to 
challenging the death sentence itself). 
 106. See JOHNSON, ROCHELEAU & MARTIN, supra note 23 (explaining how 
prison conditions and programs make a documented difference in the quality and 
impact of prison life).  
 107. See generally LORNA RHODES, TOTAL CONFINEMENT: MADNESS AND 
REASON IN THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (2004); JOHNSON, ROCHELEAU, & 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT UNTIL DEATH 1237 
Each of these sentences—imprisonment or execution—may be 
cruel in themselves, but that cruelty, in the eyes of the prisoners, 
hinges in some measure on the conditions of confinement under 
which they are served. As I have observed, drawing on an extensive 
body of interviews with condemned prisoners, the notion that 
death row confinement is not in itself punishment is 
psychologically inconceivable.108 Failure to connect conditions of 
confinement to the punishment of imprisonment or of death results 
in an inability to come to a meaningful understanding of the term 
cruel as it applies to the experience of prison sentences or death 
sentences as undergone by their recipients. 
The Eighth Amendment, as Dolovich has noted, “prohibits 
cruel and unusual punishment, but its normative force derives 
chiefly from its use of the word cruel.”109 Since “incarceration is the 
primary mode of criminal punishment”—prisons are implicated in 
all harsh sanctions—“it is necessary to determine when prison 
conditions are cruel.”110 Remarkably, as Dolovich reports, “the 
Supreme Court has thus far avoided this question.”111 In the key 
case on this matter, Farmer v. Brennan,112 Dolovich describes that 
the Court held that “unless some prison official actually knew of 
and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners, 
prison conditions are not ‘punishment’ within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment.”113 This analysis is flawed. When the state 
puts people in prison, it puts them in a dangerous and degrading 
setting “while depriving them of the capacity to provide for their 
own care and protection.”114 As a result, “the state has an 
affirmative obligation to protect prisoners from serious physical 
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and psychological harm.”115 This obligation, which amounts to an 
ongoing duty to provide for prisoners’ basic human needs, may be 
understood as “the state’s carceral burden.”116 The standard in 
Farmer117 undermines the state’s capacity to understand and 
honor its carceral burden: “It holds officers liable only for those 
risks they happen to notice—and thereby creates incentives for 
officers not to notice—despite the fact that when prison officials do 
not pay attention, prisoners may be exposed to the worst forms of 
suffering and abuse.”118 
Building on Dolovich’s work, I contend that in capital cases, 
the death penalty includes state-created conditions of confinement 
on death row and in the death house, not simply the method of 
execution by which death is administered (whether the method of 
execution, per se, is cruel is another matter entirely, beyond the 
scope of this Article). In capital cases, the state typically puts 
people on death row, an isolated and restrictive prison 
environment in which daily life unfolds under the ever-present 
threat of execution; prisoners on death row are unable “to provide 
for their own care and protection”119 in relation to the threats and 
insults of daily life on death row, let alone the threat of execution, 
which as we have noted is a carefully choreographed homicide and, 
by any reckoning, horrifying to contemplate from the profound 
vulnerability of one’s solitary cell. In the context of the death 
penalty, Dolovich’s carceral burden includes the obligation to 
provide for prisoners’ basic needs as human beings on death row 
and throughout the execution process.120 When the carceral 
burden is not honored by the state, this “causes serious harm to 
prisoners;” the resulting “prison conditions may be said to be 
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cruel.”121 This logic applies readily to death row confinement and 
execution: failure to honor the state’s carceral burden results in 
punishment that is cruel. 
Dolovich argues that the “the state will be unable to meet its 
carceral burden—which requires that prison officials meet 
prisoners’ basic human needs—unless prison officials are able to 
acknowledge and are willing to affirm the humanity and capacity 
for suffering of the people in their custody.”122 Death row 
confinement is typically a species of solitary confinement that fails 
to meet basic human needs other than food and shelter; the 
execution process is framed as an impersonal bureaucratic 
undertaking in which an unwillingness or inability to “affirm the 
humanity” of the condemned prisoner or to appreciate the 
“capacity for suffering” of these prisoners is central to the 
operation of the execution process.123 Thus, the failure to honor the 
carceral burden on death row and during the execution process is 
the norm, not the exception, as documented in studies of the 
dehumanizing effects of death row confinement and the modern 
execution process.124 
The Eighth Amendment, as Dolovich has made clear, “is 
concerned with a very particular form of punishment: that imposed 
by the state as penalty for crime.”125 The key consideration for the 
purposes of this analysis is this: “whatever conditions a prisoner is 
subjected to while incarcerated, whatever treatment he receives 
from the officials charged with administering his sentence, is the 
punishment the state has imposed.”126 As a result, “all the 
conditions to which an offender is subjected at the hands of state 
officials over the course of his incarceration are appropriately open 
to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.”127 It follows that when offenders 
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are condemned to death, the conditions of confinement under 
which they live and under which they are executed are central 
elements of the punishment for Eight Amendment purposes. 
A key feature of the carceral burden as enunciated by Dolovich 
is protection from fear. “To force prisoners to live in constant fear,” 
she states, “is to inflict a form of physical and psychological 
suffering akin to torture.”128 Prisoners on death row are, without 
question, forced to live in a state of constant fear, not only from the 
hazards of life on death row but from the threat of execution by 
officials of the prison system, if not of the very death row on which 
they live.129 To live daily in what can be called a state of dread—
again following Dolovich—suggests that prisoners on death row 
“exist in a permanently traumatized state, bereft of any peace of 
mind and constantly terrorized.”130 Anticipating some of the 
arguments in this article, Dolovich concludes, “[t]here is something 
deeply dehumanizing about being forced to endure such conditions, 
which could leave victims desperate to protect themselves at all 
costs and rob them of the ability to function in any reasoned or self-
possessed way.”131 Or, indeed, in the terms of this Article, to 
possess a self from which to maintain their humanity. 
Some prisoners, including some death row prisoners, escape 
into a state of denial, sometimes marked by intense mental 
fantasies,132 but this does not alter the cruelty of the conditions of 
confinement. It simply shows that human beings cope, well or 
badly, with extreme, even tortuous, conditions of confinement. 
Such coping in extremity has been well documented in studies of 
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death camps, perhaps the most extreme setting of torture and 
death known to modern man.133 That people can psychologically 
survive cruelty of great magnitude does not make the conditions to 
which they are exposed less cruel. Conditions are objectively cruel 
or not, independent of the person’s reaction. “[P]sychological 
suffering,” notes Dolovich, “need not leave its victims in a state of 
such heightened desperation for its infliction to be cruel.”134 As a 
corollary of this observation, conditions are cruel even if they are 
the usual fare of life in prison for those serving prison terms or 
death sentences. 
The state’s carceral duty “may be understood as that of 
ensuring the minimum conditions for maintaining prisoners’ 
physical and psychological integrity and well-being—those basic 
necessities of human life, including protection from assault, 
without which human beings cannot function and that people in 
prison need just by virtue of being human.”135 The carceral duty 
thus “offers a standard for assessing claims of cruel prison 
conditions as they arise.”136 That standard can be readily applied 
to treatment of condemned prisoners. On death row and in the 
death house, “individual officers responsible for designing and 
running the prison must be ever-conscious that prisoners are 
human beings with the same capacity for suffering as anyone else. 
Otherwise, those officers will be incapable of meeting prisoners’ 
basic needs or of recognizing dangers to their well-being.”137 No 
such humane consciousness is apparent on death row, and there is 
no evidence that “prisoners’ basic needs” or “well-being” are met on 
death row. 
Dolovich’s carceral duty is universally violated in the solitary 
confinement in service of death by state-sponsored homicide that 
is imposed on condemned prisoners. Research reviewed here shows 
unequivocally that death rows are human warehouses. Human 
beings cannot be stored like so many commodities without 
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violating their human dignity. Warehousing condemned prisoners 
denies that “prisoners are human beings with the same capacity 
for suffering as anyone else,”138 a key element of Dolovich’s carceral 
burden. These regimes embody the notion that “officers will be 
incapable of meeting prisoners’ basic needs or of recognizing 
dangers to their well-being,”139 another key element of Dolovich’s 
carceral burden. It is clear that the carceral burden owed 
condemned prisoners is not met on death row, and likely can never 
be met under the conditions of death row confinement as they exist 
today. We as a society are left with a punishment that, in its 
present and likely future form, is an instance of torture that is 
cruel as that term is understood in an Eighth Amendment context. 
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